Nel trattare il complesso fenomeno delle bolle finanziarie delle cicliche crisi che, a partire dal XVII secolo, hanno investito i mercati europei, l’articolo si focalizza sulla nascita del ‘sistema’ ideato da John Law per risollevare la situazione di pesante indebitamento in cui versava la Francia alla morte di Luigi XIV. Attraverso l’analisi della vita e dell’opera letteraria dell’economista scozzese e degli istituti dal medesimo creati, si allude, in particolare, alla Banque Generale, divenuta poi Banque Royale, ed alla Compagnia del Mississippi, si individuano i fattori strutturali di instabilità che portano a valutare criticamente gli effetti di uno sviluppo non adeguatamente controllato e regolamentato di quegli strumenti finanziari che egli aveva sostenuto indispensabili nel suo saggio Money and Trade per favorire l’andamento di un prospero mercato. L’articolo si concentra sulla difficile gestione della liquidità della massa monetaria, dimostrando come Law, divenuto Ministro delle Finanze, debba ricorrere alla forza del diritto, laddove le norme economiche non siano spontaneamente seguite da investitori renitenti; e dimostra altresì come l’emissione discrezionale di carta moneta, erogata sul solo presupposto di servire al sistema, si risolva in un potente veicolo di instabilità e contagio, tale da meritare la damnation memoriae per i successivi 80 anni.

Traitant le phénomène complexe des bulles financières des crises cycliques qui, à partir du 17e siècle, ont investi les marchés européens, l’article se focalise sur la naissance du « système » conçu par John Law afin de relever la situation de la lourde dette qui pesait sur la France à la mort de Louis XIV. À travers l’analyse de la vie et de l’œuvre littéraire de l’économiste écossais et des instituts qu’il a lui-même créés, en faisant allusion en particulier à la Banque générale devenue par la suite la Banque Royale et à la Compagnie du Mississippi, on peut identifier les facteurs structuraux d’instabilité qui portent à évaluer de façon critique les effets d’un développement mal contrôlé et réglementé de ces instruments financiers que, lui-même, avait retenu indispensables dans son essai «Money and Trade» pour favoriser le cours d’un marché prospère. L’article se concentre sur la difficile gestion de la liquidité de la masse monétaire et démontre comment Law, devenu Ministre des Finances, a dû recourir à la force du droit là où les normes économiques n’étaient pas spontanément suivies par les investisseurs réfractaires ; et il démontre en outre comment l’émission discrétionnaire de la monnaie de carte distribuée sur le seul fondement de servir au système, se résout en un puissant véhicule d’instabilité et de contagion au point de mériter la damnatio memoriae pour les 80 prochaines années.

The article deals with the complex speculative bubbles underlying the cycle of financial crises that began to strike European markets in the 17th century. In particular, it focuses on the birth of the ‘system’ that John Law created to lift France out of the heavy debt it had found itself in upon the death of Louis XIV. The Scottish economist’s life and works are analyzed, as well as the institutions that he was responsible for creating, with specific reference to the Banque Generale – which would later become the Banque Royale – and the Mississippi Company. Elements of structural instability are identified, leading to a critical assessment of the effects caused by an inadequately controlled and under-regulated development of those financial instruments which Law, in his text Money and Trade, had argued were essential to a thriving market. The article concentrates on how difficult it was to manage the liquidity of the money supply, showing how, as Minister of Finance, Law had to resort to the force of law when investors were unwilling to follow economic norms on their own. Furthermore, the article demonstrates how the discretionary issue of paper money, which was done solely based on the assumption that the system needed it, turned out to be a powerful way of fueling an epidemic of instability – so much so that it would suffer damnatio memoriae for the next 80 years.